The existence of a national style of warfare, an American Way of War, has been used to characterize fundamental elements of American military strategy. During his tenure as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell became the proponent for a strategic framework to guide the consideration of how military forces should be used to support national policy objectives. His framework was reflected in the Chairman's National Military Strategy published in early 1992 after Desert Storm under a concept titled "Decisive Force." This book traces the development and evaluates the merits of a "New American Way of War" embodied in the Decisive Force concept. Military attitudes and lessons about the utility of force are drawn from four recent conflicts.

Over the past twenty years, a revolution has occurred in relations between the American executive and legislative branches. Once a passive observer of the President's decisions on defense policy, the Congress has assumed a more aggressive role in decisions on the defense budget, arms control, war powers, sales of weapons abroad, and covert operations. Based on interviews with members of Congress and their staffs, The Politics of National Security describes and analyzes this fundamental change in the United States political system, concentrating on the political factors behind the Congress' greater assertiveness. The book explains how and why the transformation occurred and addresses the consequences for the defense of American interests abroad. Providing insights into the inner workings of Congress, this comprehensive study offers practical recommendations for resolving the long-standing issues between the two branches of United States government.

This book analyzes President Bush's new Regional Defense Strategy--the master plan for guiding the transformation of U.S. defense policy in the post-Cold War era. This book provides the first comprehensive assessment of the new strategy, analyzes the consequences for U.S. forces and alliance relations, and examines the political difficulties of transforming Bush's vision into reality. It explains major changes in U.S. defense doctrine and strategy, force and command structure, future programming requirements, and how such change has been managed.

Will current strategic planning give the United States the sort of military capabilities needed to counter threats likely in the future? Using first-hand experience at the Pentagon and an Army background, Lieutenant Colonel Peters outlines serious problems, offers fresh insights into the defense planning process, surveys the global security environment in this post-Cold War era, and makes suggestions for developing an optimal force structure for the year 2000. This risk and consequences assessment, alongside case studies of the Gulf War and other situations, shows the inner workings of the Defense Department and departs from recent literature on military reform.

Probing beneath the stable surface of the political and economic environment for defense spending, this book reveals pressures for change and conflict in Congress, the news media, and the defense industry. It shows how fewer Congressional districts are getting larger shares of the Pentagon pie and questions whether new weapons help preserve the defense industry.

In this compelling study, Eland questions the core assumptions of the American foreign policy and defense establishments that call for military interventions around the world and high and increasing defense budgets at home. He outlines a security policy more appropriate to the sober realities of the post-Cold War era. This is an approach that calls for military restraint overseas, taking advantage of the already secure U.S. geostrategic position, while safeguarding truly vital national interests. Eland details the military forces needed for this new role and calculates the reduced defense budget required to pay for these forces.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 is the most important legislation affecting U.S. national defense in the last 50 years. This act resulted from frustration in Congress and among certain military officers concerning what they believed to be the poor quality of military advice available to civilian decision-makers. It also derived from the U.S. military's perceived inability to conduct successful "joint" or multi-service operations. The Act, passed after four years of legislative debate, designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisor to the President and sought to foster greater cooperation among the military services. Goldwater-Nichols marks the latest attempt to balance competing tendencies within the Department of Defense, namely centralization versus decentralization and geographic versus functional distributions of power.

How should the Army transform to meet the new strategic challenges?

Cordesman provides a net assessment of the power projection capabilities of the US forces in the Gulf.

During World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower became convinced that the era of separate land, sea, and air operations was over and that future military operations would involve all three elements acting in concert. He foresaw that, once peace had been restored, the waste and duplication of effort which characterized America's military operations during the war would not be tolerated by an economy-minded Congress. A fiscal conservative, Eisenhower saw national security as dependent upon maintaining a healthy economy and a strong military. His goal, therefore, was the achievement of an efficient, properly balanced military establishment within the context of a healthy economy through the unification of the services into a single Cabinet level department.

This new edition of the Carnegie Endowment bestseller -- selected by Choice as "an outstanding academic book of 1995" -- now also discusses the interventions in Haiti and Bosnia, the 1998 crisis (and earlier skirmishes) with Iraq, and the decision to not intervene to halt apparent genocide in Central Africa. In the core original study, which draws upon twelve cases -- including Somalia, Lebanon, Panama, Grenada, and the Gulf War -- Richard Haass suggests political and military guidelines for potential U.S. military interventions ranging from peacekeeping and humanitarian operations to preventive strikes and all-out warfare.